WHEN “YES” MEANS NO: THE SUBJUGATION OF
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE BY EXCLUSIVE
MUNICIPAL CABLE FRANCHISES
Jonathan E. Samon∗
INTRODUCTION
Cable television subscribers are plagued by regulations that
prohibit consumer choice in selecting an individual cable television
provider. The effects of these regulations are widespread because
cable television has become a common fixture in many American
1
households. The regulations have been embedded in the industry
2
since the introduction of cable television in 1948 and have taken
3
many forms. Initially, the government imposed regulations primarily
due to the competitive effects that cable television had on local
4
television stations. As the technology developed and became more
5
commonplace, the regulations evolved in a manner all their own.
Classification of the cable television industry as a natural
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1
A study sponsored by the Cable & Telecommunications Association for
Marketing showed nearly two out of every three U.S. households had access to cable
television. National Cable & Telecommunications Association, The History of Cable
Television, at http://www.ncta.com (last visited Sept. 17, 2003).
2
Id. “Cable television originated in the United States almost simultaneously in
Arkansas, Oregon and Pennsylvania in 1948 to enhance poor reception of over-theair television signals in mountainous or geographically remote areas.” Id.
3
See infra Part II (discussing The Communications Act of 1934 [hereinafter
Communications Act], the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 [hereinafter
1984 Act], the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
[hereinafter 1992 Act], and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 [hereinafter 1996
Act]).
4
See National Cable & Telecommunications Association, supra note 1. The FCC
responded to concerns from the broadcast industry by “expand[ing] its jurisdiction
and plac[ing] restrictions on the ability of cable systems to import distant television
signals.” Id.
5
The FCC restrictions led to “a ‘freeze’ effect on the development of cable
systems in major markets, lasting into the early [19]70s.” Id. See infra Part II
(discussing the interplay between federal and local regulations).
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6

monopoly stifles consumer choice. Natural monopoly status creates
an incentive for municipalities to award exclusive franchises to cable
television providers.
This status allegedly results in greater
7
efficiencies for the industry and increased revenue for the
8
municipality. Despite the supposed benefits of a natural monopoly,
the lack of competition, in addition to hindering consumer choice,
9
frequently leads to poor service.
Competition is the current driving force behind technological
10
change in the cable television industry. The goal of competition is
to make cable television the source for distributing digital sound,
11
video, voice, and data communications to homes and offices.
12
Although the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”)
deregulated a wide array of sectors within the telecommunications
13
industry, the task of deregulating the cable industry remains
14
incomplete.
6

See infra Part I (examining the economic principles behind natural
monopolies).
7
See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY & APPLICATIONS 356 (4th ed. 1999)
(explaining that under conditions of natural monopoly, the firm’s average cost curve
is decreasing at the point it crosses market demand, so the firm could only survive if
it is monopolized).
8
Daniel E. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 365,
399 (1990). “Among the benefits [provided to the community by the monopoly
cable provider] was the cable franchise fee extracted from operators. The cable
franchise fee is a charge made by a local or state government to pay for the cost of
regulation.” Id.
9
Luis Puga, Lawmakers Hear Cable Complaints, Question BPU, PRESS OF ATLANTIC
CITY, Nov. 22, 2002, available at http://www.pressofatlanticcity.com. Members of the
New Jersey General Assembly Telecommunications and Utilities Committee
questioned the practices of the state Board of Public Utilities oversight of the cable
television industry after the Board received 19,633 complaints from customers
during 2002, up from 13,617 in 2001. Id. “The complaints included rising bills in
the expanded-basic service, poor reception, poor service, inaccurate billing and
channels that subscribers don’t want to pay for.” Id.
10
Cable TV: Advanced Technologies, Jones Telecommunications & Multimedia
Encyclopedia, at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/catvtech.html (last
visited Oct. 3, 2002).
11
Id.
12
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See infra Part II (discussing the 1996
Act’s impact on the cable industry).
13
Id. The 1996 Act eliminated regulatory barriers and encouraged competition
in nearly every sector of the communications landscape. Richard E. Wiley, The
Telecommunications Act of 1996, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/practice
groupnewsletters/telecommunications (last visited Aug. 28, 2002).
14
See infra Part II (discussing the implications of “effective competition”);
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Jones Telecommunications & Multimedia
Encyclopedia [hereinafter Jones], at http://www.digitalcentury.com/encyclo/
update/telcom1.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002) (referencing the 1996 Act’s
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15

The recently settled action between the Yankees Entertainment
16
& Sports Network, LLC
(“YES”) and Cablevision Systems
Corporation (“Cablevision”) provides a current example of the
problems associated with exclusive franchises. Until the settlement,
17
Cablevision refused to carry YES.
Cablevision customers were
unable to switch to another cable provider in an attempt to receive
YES because of the insurmountable impediment that exclusive
franchises had created. The dispute between YES and Cablevision
highlights the juxtaposition of a government-sanctioned monopoly in
a free market economy. Consumer choice is sacrificed under
monopoly conditions in favor of protecting a firm that presumably
18
cannot survive under competitive pricing.
This Comment analyzes the classification of the cable television
industry as a natural monopoly, evaluates the consequences such a
classification has on the regulatory scheme imposed on the industry,
and reveals the viability of introducing competition into the industry.
Part I provides a background of the economic concepts discussed
throughout this Comment, such as natural monopolies and
monopoly pricing. This section also discusses current events that
have brought renewed relevance to this topic, in particular, the
dispute between YES and Cablevision. Part II contemplates whether
natural monopolies create the need for regulations or whether the
regulations create natural monopolies. The checkered regulatory
history of cable television demonstrates how uncertainty regarding
cable television’s role in society influenced initial congressional
decision making. Similar trepidation hampered state and local
governments when they gained jurisdiction over cable television and
continue to plague the industry today.
Part III examines the rationale for the characterization of the
consideration of satellite television as not being effective competition for cable
systems, thus precluding those systems that compete with satellite providers from
deregulation).
15
Richard Sandomir, Cablevision Agrees to Carry the YES Network, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2003, at D1 [hereinafter Sandomir I]. The YES Network and Cablevision reached
an agreement on March 12, 2003 “with a one-year deal that will make the network’s
Yankees and Nets games available to Cablevision’s nearly three million subscribers in
the Bronx, Brooklyn, Westchester, New Jersey and Connecticut, starting March 31.”
Id. That agreement subsequently broke down, but New York State Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer brokered the final one-year agreement in time for the start of the
Yankees’ season on March 31. Richard Sandomir, Cablevision and YES Reach
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2003, at S2 [hereinafter Sandomir II].
16
Complaint, Yankees Entm’t & Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp.
and CSC Holdings, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02-CV-3242) [hereinafter Yankees].
17
Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4.
18
See LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356-57.
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cable television industry as a natural monopoly in the first place. The
novelty of the technology was a significant factor at the time of the
introduction of cable television because of the lack of suppliers and
expertise. With those hurdles long since surpassed, the logic
supporting cable television’s classification no longer prevails. As a
result, the classification must be modified.
Part IV presents examples of how the classification of industries
as natural monopolies often suppresses consumer choice regarding
rates and service. Although this Comment specifically targets the
cable television industry, the effects are common throughout many
19
industries providing typical household utilities. Given the negative
effects of natural monopolies, protecting a particular supplier cannot
be the ideal solution when alternatives, such as a competitive market,
exist for the video marketplace.
This Comment concludes that an obvious alternative arising
20
from the core tenets of the American free-market system is to
remove the regulatory framework that grants exclusive franchises in
the cable television industry and to permit true competition
throughout the video marketplace. Economists have long lauded
competition as the most effective means of preserving consumer
21
choice.
Although the introduction of direct broadcast satellite
(“DBS”) television has added an element of competition to the video
marketplace, the administrative component of purchasing DBS
22
service is not yet at a level comparable to free market choice to
consider it a viable alternative. Even though it is not a perfect
substitute, DBS has opened the door to the possibility of true
competition, such as having two or more cable television providers in
a single municipality, finally breaking the local cable monopoly. The
emergence of a viable competitor to cable television supports the

19

Alexandra I. Metzner, Were California’s Electricity Price Shocks Nothing More Than a
New Form of Stranded Costs?, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 536 (2002). California’s electricity
system suffered because it “was weak and was not properly servicing demand or
maintaining sufficient electricity reserves; this was attributable to both wholesalers’
lack of motivation to cut costs . . . and to the industry’s function as a natural
monopoly.” Id. at 536 n.7.
20
MARK S. MASSEL, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY—LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES
16-17 (1962).
21
See, e.g., JOHN MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION AS A DYNAMIC PROCESS 9-18 (1961);
ANDREAS G. PAPANDREOU & JOHN T. WHEELER, COMPETITION AND ITS REGULATION 3-8
(1954).
22
A 2002 industry estimate showed cable subscribership at approximately sixtyfive million households and DBS subscribership at twenty million households.
Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, As Satellite Dishes It Out, Cable TV Fights Back, BUS. WK.,
Jan. 13, 2002, at 40.
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idea of removing the last remnant of regulation in the video
marketplace by eliminating exclusive municipal cable franchises.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Legal and Factual Background
On April 29, 2002, YES filed a complaint in the United States
23
District Court for the Southern District of New York against
Cablevision in an attempt to compel Cablevision to carry all New York
24
Yankees games that YES broadcasts. Cablevision is the largest cable
25
provider in the greater New York metropolitan area (“region”), with
26
customers in nearly one million subscriber households in New Jersey
27
and over three million subscriber households in the region overall.
The complaint alleged that Cablevision abused its monopoly power
28
over the cable television market in the region, protecting its own
regional sports networks at the expense of the fledgling YES
29
network.
Cablevision is the majority owner and manager of the Madison
Square Garden Network (“MSG”) and Fox Sports New York
30
(“FSNY”). The YES complaint alleged that prior to the creation of
YES in 2001, MSG and FSNY were the only networks in the region
“primarily devoted to providing live broadcasts of local professional
teams and other sports programming of particular interest to greater
31
New York metropolitan area sports fans.” Cablevision carried MSG
and FSNY on its own systems and sold the channels to other cable
32
systems in the region. With the creation of YES, and the resulting
competition in the local sports market, Cablevision refused to carry
YES although it had always sold its own channels to other cable
33
systems. The agreements between YES and other cable providers
included paying YES a monthly fee of $2 per subscriber to carry the
23

Yankees, at 1.
Matthew Futterman, Network Sues Over Yankees’ Blackout, THE STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, NJ), Apr. 30, 2002, at 13.
25
Matthew Futterman, Nothing New on YES Front, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ),
Mar. 30, 2002, at 30.
26
Id.
27
Yankees, at 3.
28
Futterman, supra note 24, at 13.
29
Id.
30
Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4.
31
Yankees, at 3.
32
Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4.
33
Id.
24
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34

network on the expanded-basic level. YES offered to discount that
35
rate to reach an earlier settlement with Cablevision. Prior to the
final settlement, however, Cablevision refused to move from its
36
position and settle the dispute.
YES filed the complaint one month after reaching an agreement
with AT&T Broadband, which entailed offering YES on basic
37
programming to its 250,000 Connecticut subscribers. At the time of
that agreement, YES had arrangements with twenty-four cable
38
providers in addition to the DBS company DirecTV. This made YES
available on basic programming of every major cable system in the
39
region, except Cablevision, bringing distribution of YES to
40
approximately 5.3 million subscribers. YES filed the lawsuit after
41
eight months of delay in negotiations, resulting in Cablevision’s 2.9
42
million subscribers in the region losing the ability to view 130 of the
43
162 Yankees games during the 2002 season. Hopes for an end to
the dispute during the 2002 baseball season diminished after
44
Cablevision requested 660 days for trial preparation and sent a
representative to only one of the seven public forums held by a New
45
York City Council panel. Prior to the settlement with YES, a district
court judge granted Cablevision its motion to dismiss an anti46
competition claim brought by consumers in the New York area.
Conversely, the YES suit against Cablevision survived a motion to
47
dismiss. One week before the settlement, the New Jersey General
34

Futterman, supra note 24, at 18. As a result of the settlement, Cablevision was
expected to pay a similar monthly fee per subscriber. Sandomir I, supra note 15, at
D4.
35
Richard Sandomir, Wait Till Next Year, YES Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2002, at
D5. YES Chairman Leo J. Hindery Jr. “offered to discount the first year from a
monthly subscriber fee of $2 to $1.28 and the second year from $2.12 to $1.75.” Id.
36
Cablevision Seeks a Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at D2 [hereinafter
Cablevision]. Cablevision had offered to pay a subscriber rate of only fifty-five cents.
Id.
37
Futterman, supra note 25, at 30.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Yankees, at 2.
41
Futterman, supra note 24, at 13.
42
Futterman, supra note 25, at 30.
43
Id. The remaining thirty-two games that season were available to most viewers
on broadcast or basic cable channels WCBS, ESPN, or Fox. Steve Zipay & Harry
Berkowitz, 180 Days Later, Standoff Continues, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 2002, at C19.
Postseason games aired on Fox or ABC Family. Id.
44
Cablevision, supra note 36, at D2.
45
Zipay & Berkowitz, supra note 43, at C19.
46
Moccio v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 208 F. Supp. 2d 361 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
47
Yankees Entm’t and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 224 F.
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Assembly passed a bill designed to compel Cablevision to broadcast
48
YES on its system.
The effects of the impasse damaged the bottom line of both
parties. Cablevision reported 5,400 subscriber defections to DirecTV
49
50
through April 30, 2002, and 17,000 defections through June 30.
Projections of subscriber losses for the full-year ranged from 27,500
51
to 45,000. YES estimated the net effect on Cablevision to be a loss of
52
YES felt the impact of the dispute in a
$360 million in value.
different respect. Due to the deflated number of subscribers,
Yankees telecasts on YES averaged a 2.0 cable rating in the region,
down thirty-three percent from Yankees telecasts on MSG during the
53
2001 season. Diminished ratings hurt YES through the resultant
54
decrease in advertising revenue.
Furthermore, the standoff had
consequences extending beyond the baseball season, as YES obtained
the broadcast rights to New Jersey Nets basketball games for ten years
55
beginning with the 2002-03 season. The Nets had previously been in
56
a long-standing agreement with FSNY.
B. The Economic Rationale of Natural Monopolies
The YES complaint referred to Cablevision’s monopoly power
57
over its “captive cable television customers.” Cablevision possesses
this monopoly power due to the exclusive franchises that local
58
franchising authorities awarded to cable operators.
The

Supp. 2d 657 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). The motion was denied, except in regard to the claim
under New York’s Donnelly Act. Id. at 679.
48
Tom Hester, YES Network Wins Support in Assembly, THE STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
NJ), Mar. 4, 2003, at 13. A sponsor of the bill claimed that its main objective was to
encourage a resumption of negotiations between Cablevision and the YES Network
after sixteen months of bickering. Id.
49
Sandomir, supra note 35, at D5.
50
Id.
51
Id. Cablevision estimated the number of subscriber losses to be from 30,000 to
45,000. Id. A cable industry official estimated it at 27,500. Id.
52
Id. “Hindery said Cablevision’s subscribers were worth an estimated $4,000
each, a figure based on what similar cable systems have sold for; if 90,000 have
defected, . . . the company has lost $360 million in value.” Id.
53
Zipay & Berkowitz, supra note 43, at C19. Each rating point represents 73,000
homes. Id.
54
Id.
55
Richard Sandomir, Nets Leave Cablevision and Join YES, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2002,
at D4.
56
Id.
57
Yankees, at 1.
58
See 47 U.S.C. § 541 (1996) (prohibiting exclusive franchises). But see infra Part
III (explaining de facto exclusive franchises).
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classification of the cable television industry as a natural monopoly
produces exclusive cable franchises. A natural monopoly is “an
industry in which each firm’s average cost curve is decreasing at the
59
point where it crosses market demand.” This phenomenon occurs
60
when there are relatively large fixed costs associated with developing
61
a product, but low marginal costs associated with distributing the
62
product. Consequently, most household utilities, such as electricity
63
and cable television, are considered natural monopolies.
Under
these conditions, if the utility were to price competitively, it would
64
develop an operating loss and not survive. Therefore, pursuant to
the goal of promoting economic efficiency, such industries are
classified as natural monopolies and typically afforded government
65
regulatory protection against competition. Specifically, in the cable
television industry, once the company has its cables in place to
transport the signal to its customer base (the cable company’s fixed
cost), the cost incurred by the company in delivering its service to
66
each individual customer is extremely low.
67
The telephone industry was once heavily regulated, based upon

59

LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356. See also 2 HAROLD DEMSETZ, EFFICIENCY,
COMPETITION, AND POLICY, THE ORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 76 (1989)
(defining natural monopoly as a situation where “because of production scale
economies, it is less costly for one firm to produce a commodity in a given market
than it is for two or more firms, then one firm will survive; if left unregulated, that
firm will set price and output at monopoly levels”).
60
Fixed costs are items that remain the same “regardless of the level of output,”
often called “overhead.” LEONARD W. WEISS, ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN INDUSTRY 41
(1961).
61
“[M]arginal cost is the change in cost which will accompany a small change in
output.” Id. at 52-53.
62
LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356. An example is a software manufacturer
distributing their product over the internet with marginal cost at essentially zero. Id.
In a competitive market, the software would sell at marginal cost and nearly be free;
the market would not survive that pricing scheme. Id. A monopolist can instead sell
for substantially more than marginal cost, earn enough to cover the fixed costs, and
can remain in business. Id.
63
E.g., Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 401
n.8 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining the natural monopoly phenomenon in relation to
cable television, electric utilities, and water works).
64
See LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 356-57.
65
Id. at 418.
66
Kenneth Katkin, Cable Open Access and Direct Access to INTELSTAT, 53 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 77, 84 (2002); see also Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis,
694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th Cir. 1982) (detailing the costs incurred by cable television
companies).
67
See United States v. Western Electric Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 64,900
(Aug. 24, 1982) (requiring AT&T “to divest all 22 Bell operating companies
providing local exchange telephone service”).
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a natural monopoly rationale similar to that of cable television, until
Congress dramatically altered that regulatory landscape with the 1996
68
Act.
The 1996 Act overhauled and deregulated most of the
69
For example, the 1996 Act removed
communications industry.
restrictions imposed upon the telephone industry by the 1982 AT&T
70
71
Consent Decree. It also permitted the “Baby Bells” to enter the
72
long-distance telephone market, while simultaneously permitting
73
long distance carriers to enter the local market. This deregulation
resulted in competition in both the long distance and local telephone
74
markets unseen since the AT&T break-up.
In the newly deregulated telephone industry, customers electing
to change their local provider can do so simply by calling their new
75
provider of choice. Although the service provider is switched with
ease from the consumer’s perspective, the switch requires more work
76
on the part of the telephone companies. Even so, the telephone
77
companies have enough incentive to complete the switch. Switching
cable television providers can be accomplished through the same
means as switching telephone service providers; yet, customers do not
have the option to switch cable providers due to the barriers imposed
by exclusive franchises. Although the economics of the services that
telephone and cable television companies provide are unmistakably
78
similar, the 1996 Act did not effectively introduce competition into
68

Supra note 12.
See infra Part II (analyzing the regulatory landscape).
70
Western Electric Co., 1982-2 Trade Cases (CCH) ¶ 64,900.
71
This term is commonly used to refer to the twenty-two Bell operating
companies providing local telephone service that were divested from AT&T in the
1982 consent decree. See supra note 67.
72
See Wiley, supra note 13.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
In many cases, the new carrier may in fact call the consumers. See Deregulated,
CONSUMER REP., July 2002, at 30 [hereinafter Deregulated] (lamenting the negative
effects of deregulation “where incessant telemarketers interrupt your dinner but
customer service won’t answer the phone”).
76
Miles W. Hughes, Telecommunications Reform and the Death of the Local Exchange
Monopoly, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 179, 211-12 (1996). After obtaining state authority to
provide local telephone service, the new providers must negotiate with the
incumbent for “interconnection and collocation with the existing local exchange
network.” Id. at 211. The new providers’ expensive alternative to negotiation is to
construct a local infrastructure of its own to provide service. Id. at 211 n.282.
77
Id. at 212. Incumbent cable providers have incentives to complete negotiations
because “the [1996] Act does not permit them to enter the long-distance market
until effective competition exists within their local exchange territory.” Id.; see also 47
U.S.C. § 271 (1996).
78
Katkin, supra note 66, at 84.
69
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the cable television industry through deregulation.

II. A REVIEW OF THE VARYING LOGIC BEHIND THE REGULATIONS THAT
SOLIDIFIED CABLE TELEVISION’S MONOPOLY STATUS
The checkered regulatory history of cable television illustrates
the difficulty Congress has had in shaping a policy that best suits the
technology. Congress’s oft-changing regulation of cable television
80
began in the early 1930s when radio entered mainstream America.
81
When public concern grew over its effects, Congress responded by
82
enacting the Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”).
The Communications Act regulated all wire and radio
communications available at that time, namely transmissions by radio,
83
telephone, and telegraph. The Communications Act created the
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) as the body in charge
84
of promulgating regulations over the aforementioned media.
Furthermore, the Communications Act gave the FCC jurisdiction
85
over common carriers. Nonetheless, the FCC initially declined to
regulate cable television on the grounds that it did not fall within the
86
statutory definition of common carrier.
This abdication by the
federal government left cable television regulation to state and local
governments, which they engaged in by franchising cable systems to
87
use public ways for their distribution systems.
The FCC reversed course in 1959 when cable television
88
operators began including non-local signals on their cable systems.
79

See, e.g., Jones, supra note 14.
Kent D. Wakeford, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted Intrusion into
Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 239 (1995); see also 2 ERIK BARNOUW, THE
GOLDEN WEB: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 22-26 (1968).
81
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 239.
82
Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§§ 151-614).
83
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 239 n.26.
84
Id. at 240.
85
See 47 U.S.C. § 153 (1934) (defining common carriers as “any person engaged
as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or
radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, . . . but a person
engaged in radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be
deemed a common carrier”).
86
Frontier Broad. Co. v. Laramie Cmty. T.V. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958)
(dismissing complaint asserting that cable television systems are common carriers
within the meaning of the Communications Act under the rationale that the signals
received and distributed by the cable systems are determined by the system and not
the subscriber).
87
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 241.
88
Thomas W. Hazlett, Station Brakes: The Government’s Campaign Against Cable
80
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While cable television had not previously affected local broadcasters,
89
the FCC stepped in at that point to protect them from competition.
90
The FCC later refined its position in 1972, stating that cable
operators are neither broadcasters nor common carriers, but instead
“cable is a hybrid that requires identification and regulation as a
91
separate force in communications.”
The FCC, noting the deleterious effect of over-regulating a
growing industry, almost immediately engaged in deregulation of
92
cable television. The FCC’s new approach examined jurisdictional
and technological limitations and eliminated duplicative, costly
93
regulations.
Congress later followed suit with the Cable
94
Communications Policy Act of 1984 (“1984 Act”). The 1984 Act
codified the collective regulatory schemes of federal, state, and local
95
governments.
Most notable was the explicit bifurcation of
regulatory power that “vested local authorities with extensive control
96
over granting cable franchises.” Because the 1984 Act mandated
that new competitors obtain a municipal cable franchise before
entering the market, municipal officials stifled competition by
97
offering exclusive licenses to the highest bidder. Additionally, the
1984 Act prohibited local telephone companies, the likeliest cable
98
99
competitors, from providing video service. Therefore, with this
near impenetrable protection from competition and the elimination
of local rate controls, Congress enabled cable operators to exploit
100
their monopoly power.
Television, REASON, Feb. 1995, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/
hazlett/rahazlett72.htm.
89
Id. See, e.g., Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962),
aff’d, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding cable television to be a communications
common carrier).
90
FCC Cable Television Rep. and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
91
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 243 (citing Robert F. Copple, Cable Television and
the Allocation of Regulatory Power: A Study of Government Demarcation and Roles, 44 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1, 32 (1991)).
92
See Duplicative and Excessive Over-Regulation of Cable Television, Rep. and
Order, 54 F.C.C.2d 855 (1975).
93
Id.
94
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779
(1984) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.).
95
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 244.
96
Id.
97
Hazlett, supra note 88. Most municipal officials felt “as New York Mayor John
Lindsay had when he remarked that cable franchises were like ‘urban oil wells
beneath our city streets.’” Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id. The 1984 Act was “sponsored by then-Rep. Timothy Wirth [from
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A short time later, Congress again reversed course and passed
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
101
1992 (“1992 Act”).
The 1992 Act, passed over President Bush’s
102
veto, attempted to address some of the problems that remained
103
after the 1984 Act.
Congress remained watchful of the cable
television industry and again altered the regulatory landscape with
passage of the 1996 Act. This legislation was designed, in part, to
104
open “all telecommunications markets to competition.”
The 1984 Act freed systems from rate regulations when the FCC
105
determined that they were subject to effective competition.
One
deregulatory component of the 1996 Act updated the term “effective
106
The 1996
competition” from its initial statutory use by Congress.
Act added a provision stating that once a local telephone company,
or similar service, offers video programming comparable to the cable
107
operator’s service to that area, effective competition exists.
When
Colorado], often called the congressman from TCI.” Id. Tele-Communications Inc.,
the largest cable operator in the United States at that time, is headquartered in
Denver. Id.
101
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992) (codified as amended in 47 U.S.C.).
102
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 244.
103
Id. The pertinent provisions of the 1992 Act included the prohibition of
exclusive municipal franchises due to their adverse effects on consumers and the
establishment of price ceilings on rates. Id. The 1992 Act also included a “mustcarry” provision that required “cable television systems to devote a portion of their
channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations.” Id. at 245 n.66.
104
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-458, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11. In
regards to provisions in then existing legislation that prohibited telephone
companies from providing video programming to subscribers in their service areas,
the report noted three government agencies “the FCC, the Commerce Department’s
National Telecommunications and Information Administration and the Department
of Justice’s Antitrust Division” who “found that the statute impedes competition in
the cable industry.” See 47 U.S.C. § 533(b), repealed by 1996 Act, supra note 68, §
302(b)(1).
105
Id.
106
See Brenner, supra note 8, at 404 (describing the initial use of “effective
competition”).
107
The 1996 Act, supra note 68, finds effective competition to exist where a
multichannel video programming distributor [hereinafter MVPD] meets one of four
tests within its franchise area:
(A) fewer than 30 percent of households in the franchise area
subscribe to the service of a cable system; (B) the franchise area is (i)
served by at least two unaffiliated [MVPDs] each of which offers
comparable video programming to at least 50 percent of the
households in the franchise area; and (ii) the number of households
subscribing to programming services offered by multichannel video
programming services offered by [MVPDs] other than the largest
[MVPD] exceeds 15 percent of the households in the franchise area;
(C) a [MVPD] operated by the franchising authority for that franchise
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the determination is made that effective competition exists, the
municipality “may no longer regulate subscriber rates for the basic
108
service tier.”
The 1996 Act’s overall goal of competition is partially met
through the interplay allowed between cable television and telephone
109
service providers. Previously restricted by the AT&T break-up, local
telephone carriers can now provide long-distance service and,
correspondingly, long-distance providers can offer local telephone
110
services.
In addition, telephone companies can provide video
programming and cable companies are allowed to provide local
111
telephone service. Although attempting to introduce competition
in the video marketplace by permitting telephone companies to
compete with cable television providers, the 1996 Act does not
112
prohibit municipal cable franchising, which remains the greatest
impediment to competition. Thus, the 1996 Act has only partially
achieved the goal of true competition in the cable television market.
Still, the 1996 Act does provide insight into the possible future of
competition in the cable television industry. Commentators have
considered the phenomenon of overbuilding as a costly, yet possible,
113
method to introduce competition into the cable television industry.
In allowing competition in local telephone service, the 1996 Act
requires incumbent local telephone companies to work with any new
area offers video programming to at least 50 percent of the households
in that franchise area; or (D) a local exchange carrier or its affiliate (or
any [MVPD] using the facilities of such carrier or its affiliate) offers
video programming service directly to subscribers by any means (other
than direct-to-home satellite service) in the franchise area of an
unaffiliated cable operator which is providing cable service in that
franchise area, but only if the video programming services so offered in
that area are comparable to the video programming services provided
by the unaffiliated cable operator in that area.
47 U.S.C. § 543(l)(1)(A-D) (1996).
108
Gregory W. Stepanicich, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Responding to a New
Regulatory Maze, at http://www.rwglaw.com/Articles (last visited Oct. 3, 2002). Nonbasic service tier regulation was set to expire on its own. Id. The term “service tier”
means a cable service for which the operator charges a separate rate. 47 U.S.C. §
522(17) (1996).
109
See supra note 67 (explaining the divestiture of the AT&T Bell operating
companies).
110
See Jones, supra note 14.
111
Id.
112
Stepanicich, supra note 108. While cities may continue to franchise and
regulate cable services, they are prohibited from extending franchises to other
telecommunication services. Id.
113
See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 8, at 404. Overbuilding involves “constructing a
competing cable system over a territory already served by or franchised to another.”
Id.
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local telephone companies to “provide interconnection, number
114
portability, dialing parity, and access to rights-of-way.”
Similar
cooperation between cable television competitors could serve to
eliminate some of the costs of overbuilding a cable system.
In regards to rights-of-way, the 1996 Act states that no
municipality may prohibit any entity from providing interstate or
115
intrastate telecommunications service.
Municipalities do retain a
116
“safe harbor” provision that allows them “to manage the public
rights-of-way and to require fair and reasonable compensation from
telecommunication providers on a competitively neutral and
117
nondiscriminatory basis.”
As a result of this provision, a statutory
right grants competing cable providers the ability to purchase the use
of public rights-of-way from the municipalities for use in their
distribution systems. Exclusive franchise grants, however, frustrate
the ability of a competing cable system to enter the market in the first
place.
The variations in Congress’s regulatory approach to cable
television display its uncertainty about cable television’s true
classification and the potential fallacy in designating the cable
television industry as a natural monopoly. Consequently, the
monopoly status of cable results more from governmental action,
118
such as municipal franchising, than from economic factors.
This
conclusion warrants examination of the economic and political
effects of the removal of the cable industry regulations to allow
competition in the video marketplace.
III. DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF CABLE TELEVISION AS A NATURAL
MONOPOLY AND THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE FRANCHISING PROCESS
119

Generally, natural monopoly conditions result in government
120
regulation of an industry. The supposition that cable television was

114

Jones, supra note 14.
47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996).
116
§ 253(c). One commentator noted that “an important addition to the 1996
Act . . . preserved the power of local agencies to manage the use of their public
rights-of-way.” Stepanicich, supra note 108.
117
§ 253(c).
118
Quincy Cable T.V., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
119
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 260-61. Natural monopolies occur in markets
“with inherent structural characteristics that make it more efficient for one operator
to offer services in the absence of competition.” Id. (citing Richard A. Posner,
Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 548 (1969)).
120
Id. at 261.
115
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121

a natural monopoly materialized legislatively in municipalities
122
123
awarding exclusive franchises. This process was a financial boon
for municipalities as the franchising process included rewards by way
124
Blinded by those rewards,
of franchise fees and other services.
municipalities ignored typical market considerations, specifically
125
competitive pricing, during the franchising process.
Case law exposes the judicial view of exclusive franchise grants as
126
the inescapable outcome of a competitive market.
In this view,
exclusive franchise grants that eliminate competition serve to avoid
127
the “wasteful duplication of facilities.” This “wasteful duplication of
facilities” is a product of the public ownership of the public rights-of128
way that provide the distribution system that operators compete to
129
access.
One commentator’s alternative solution permits private
ownership of the distribution system running below each individual’s
property so that he could connect to whichever provider he
130
preferred.
This scenario precludes the need for competing
providers to incur unnecessary costs in entering the market and
defeats the possibility of the duplication of facilities.
121

Id. at 246. The FCC concluded that “local governments are inescapably
involved in the [franchising] process because cable makes use of streets and ways and
because local authorities are able to bring a special expertness to such matters, for
example, as how best to parcel large urban areas into cable districts.” Id. (quoting
FCC Cable Television Rep. and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 207 (1972)).
122
Brenner, supra note 8, at 371. While franchises have been denominated
“nonexclusive,” cable franchises developed a monopoly status that “was accepted by
federal and local authorities, by the participants in the franchise process, by the
victorious cable operator, and by the public.” Id.
123
47 U.S.C. § 522(9) (1996) (defining the term “franchise” as “an initial
authorization, or renewal thereof . . . issued by a franchising authority, whether such
authorization is designated as a franchise, permit, license, resolution, contract,
certificate, agreement, or otherwise, which authorizes the construction or operation
of a cable system”); see also 47 U.S.C. § 522(10) (defining the term “franchising
authority” as “any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to
grant a franchise”).
124
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 247. “The local franchise boards recognized their
ability to extort exorbitant services and favors in the process of granting a cable
franchise.” Id.
125
Brenner, supra note 8, at 370.
126
See, e.g., Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126
(7th Cir. 1982) (stating that “[a]n alternative procedure [to the competitive free-forall] is to pick the most efficient competitor at the outset, give him a monopoly, and
extract from him in exchange a commitment to provide reasonable service at
reasonable rates”).
127
Id.
128
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996).
129
Brenner, supra note 8, at 395.
130
DEMSETZ, supra note 59, at 81. This alternative allows the company owning the
facility to sell it to the new provider. Id.
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The public rights-of-way justification for franchising is also
flawed with respect to the degree that the government’s property
131
interest is implicated. Cable operators use public property by either
digging a trench to lay the cable or sharing a utility or telephone
132
easement. The latter typically results in payment on the part of the
cable operator to the public utility for the permission to occupy part
133
The
of the easement that the government has already issued.
former appears to implicate a government property interest only to
the extent of the cost “borne by the municipality associated with such
134
135
use.” The 1996 Act supports such a pricing rationale, whose “payper-use” scheme weakens the justification for the extensive
136
governmental control present in the franchising process.
Despite the apparent contradiction of the de jure classification of
cable television operators as a natural monopoly, the operators
maintain their de facto monopoly status that began early in cable’s
inception. A large factor in the monopoly status of cable television
operators is that no viable technology provided true competition to
the array of services available through cable during the 1970s and
137
early 1980s.
The further development of competing technologies
and services over the next two decades, however, created viable
alternatives that weakened cable’s de facto monopoly status. Thus,
after the 1996 Act permitted telephone companies to enter the video
138
marketplace, telephone companies and the improvement of DBS
systems posed a significant threat to the monopoly status of cable
139
television.

131

Wakeford, supra note 80, at 252.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 252-53.
135
See 47 U.S.C. § 253(c) (1996).
136
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 252-53. “[T]he right to impose a charge for the
use of rights-of-way [does not] provide[] justification for regulatory authority over all
other aspects of cable television.” Id.
137
Brenner, supra note 8, at 400-01. The variety of available technologies
included satellite master antenna television (SMATV), multipoint distribution service
(MDS) and DBS. Id. SMATV was an alternative to cable, but was not in direct
competition with cable. Id. SMATV was most often found in apartment buildings
where the building owner had a choice between SMATV or cable, but the subscriber
could not make that choice. Id. MDS was not a true competitor to cable because it
only offered one channel initially, although it was later modified to have fourchannel groups in each market. Id. DBS was not viewed as a viable alternative to
cable due to the ten to twenty-foot satellite dishes required for reception. Id. It was
not until the 1990s that smaller, more easily mountable dishes were introduced. Id.
138
See supra Part II (discussing the effect of the latest wave of deregulation).
139
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269.
132

2004

COMMENT

763

Telephone companies were uniquely positioned to compete with
140
cable companies.
They appeared able to provide services at rates
141
lower than were possible through overbuilding and able to recover
142
Those incumbent local exchange carriers,
the costs of entry.
143
however, have exited the video business.
Electric and gas utilities
are potential competitors to cable television, primarily due to already
possessing
“access
to
public
rights
of
way,
existing
telecommunications facilities, and existing relationships with
144
Despite these advantages, their entrance into the
customers.”
145
marketplace has been slow and is not expected to be widespread.
The reluctance of telephone companies and public utilities to enter
146
the cable television market allowed the emergence of DBS as the
primary competition facing cable television operators.
DBS technology has a distinct advantage in competing with
cable. Although their systems do incur fixed costs of entry, primarily
from the need to place a satellite in orbit to distribute their signal to
147
subscribers, they can spread the cost of entry over a greater
148
distribution area. The new wave of DBS systems began in 1994 with

140

Id. The theory of telephone companies competing with cable providers “rests
upon the assumption that a telephone company already has the infrastructure in
place to provide cable programming to subscribers.” Id. “Without needing to invest
in the fixed costs required by cable, the telephone company could garner a distinct
advantage over the cable competitor.” Id.
141
See supra note 113 (explaining the concept of overbuilding).
142
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269.
143
In re Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Seventh Ann. Rep., 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6009 (2001)
[hereinafter FCC Seventh Ann. Rep.]. Most chose to sell their MVPD systems and
preferred instead to market DBS systems. Id. BellSouth, however, still operates some
overbuild cable systems. In re Matter of Ann. Assessment of the Status of
Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Ann. Rep.,
17 F.C.C.R. 26901, 26905 (2002) [hereinafter FCC Ninth Ann. Rep.].
144
FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26947.
145
Id.
146
Id. at 26904. The four largest incumbent local exchange carriers have largely
exited the video business. Id. A few smaller local exchange carriers continue to
offer, or are preparing to offer, MVPD service over existing telephone lines. Id.
“[U]tilities are not yet widespread competitors in the telecommunications or cable
markets. Mainly, it appears that utilities will provide MVPD competition in scattered
localities.” Id. at 26947.
147
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 269. DBS systems are able to recoup their fixed
costs of entry due to the large number of potential subscribers resulting from an
orbiting satellite. Id. at 270. Additionally, the satellite has other potential uses
outside of television programming. Id.
148
Id. DBS operators can provide “coverage to a greater number of possible
subscribers than an equivalent cable investment from an overbuild cable operator
would provide.” Id.

764

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:747

the launch of two competing providers, Direct Satellite Service and
149
150
Primestar.
Initial subscribership to those DBS systems left the
151
industry with high hopes for the future. Early hurdles prevented a
152
quicker start to DBS truly competing with cable, but they were
overcome through legislative help that broadened the available
153
service granted to providers
and through technological
154
DBS thus
improvements that lowered the cost for consumers.
obtained a foothold allowing it to exceed even the most optimistic
155
expectations for market growth at its onset.
A monopoly, in general, exists when there is only one seller of
156
services with no close substitutes.
That single seller possesses the
ability to affect market prices through its actions by way of its
157
monopoly power. With DBS service at the forefront, in addition to
telephone and utility companies possibly competing for subscribers,
alternative providers are moving into position to offer video services
158
at competitive prices.
This trend affects the cable company’s
149

THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE
TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 195 (1997).
150
Id. at 196. In its first year of operation, beginning July 1994, DirecTV achieved
subscribership of 600,000 households, about half of which were homes passed by
cable systems. Christopher Stern, DBS and Cable Square Off at the FCC, BROAD. &
CABLE, July 10, 1995, at 42. The FCC defines “homes passed” as “the total number of
households capable of receiving cable television service.” FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17
F.C.C.R. at 26909 n.11.
151
HAZLETT & SPITZER, supra note 149, at 196. Industry forecasters predicted that
DBS along with cable’s other competitors, wireless cable and telephone company
overbuilders, would reach “nearly one-third of cable’s projected total” of subscribers
by the year 2000. Id.
152
In re Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Mkt. for the Delivery
of Video Programming, Fifth Ann. Rep., Separate Statement of Comm’r Susan Ness,
13 F.C.C.R. 24284, 24483. Potential DBS subscribers through 1997 declined to sign
up due to “high installation costs, significant costs to hook up additional TV sets, and
the lack of broadcast television service.” Id.
153
Id. After 1997, the cost of installation plummeted, yet it remained expensive to
add service to additional TV sets. Id.
154
FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26904. The FCC attributes part of the
growth of DBS “to the authority granted to DBS operators to distribute local
broadcast television stations in their local markets by the Satellite Home Viewer
Improvement Act of 1999.” Id.
155
Id. As of December 2002, DBS subscribers represented 20.3 percent of all
MVPDs. Id. Between June 2001 and June 2002, DBS subscribers grew at a rate
significantly greater than the cable subscriber growth rate, “from almost 16 million
households to about 18 million households.” Id.
156
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 260.
157
LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 344.
158
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 266. The entrance of multiple cable providers,
whether in a natural monopoly or a competitive system, results in heated
competition to attract subscribers. Id. Such competition focuses the resources of the
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monopoly power and challenges its status as a protected monopoly.
IV. THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CABLE TELEVISION’S MONOPOLY STATUS
MANIFESTED IN HIGHER RATES, POORER SERVICE, AND SUBJUGATION
OF CONSUMER CHOICE
The most insidious effects of monopoly conditions are lower
159
160
production
and higher costs
as compared to competitive
conditions. In the cable franchising scheme, lower production
manifests itself through a “misallocation of resources result[ing] in
161
diminished satisfaction of society’s wants.” The higher costs can be
162
While pecuniary costs associated
pecuniary and non-pecuniary.
with running a business occur under any economic condition, the
consequences of cable franchising and monopoly conditions are
163
higher costs or poorer service.
This system is unjustified because
the costs passed on to consumers from the cable companies
constitute an essentially needless wealth transfer from consumers to
164
their municipality.
Despite the costs associated with obtaining an exclusive
municipal franchise, cable operators are willing participants in the
municipal franchising process. The monopoly status created by an
exclusive franchise permits cable operators to recoup their costs from
165
166
consumers by charging higher rates for their services.
Without
competition, consumers are forced to pay higher rates if they wish to
have cable television service, as they cannot elect to obtain service
competitors on providing the most attractive services and fees to the consumers. Id.
159
Id. at 281.
160
LANDSBURG, supra note 7, at 344. Through its monopoly power, a monopolist
can “affect the market price of its output.” Id.
161
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 282 (quoting Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as
the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 67, 72-73 (1982)).
162
Wakeford, supra note 80, at 281. “Municipal governments impose fees
upon . . . cable operators that would not be required in an efficient market.” Id.
These costs serve to create monopolies and prevent competition from offering their
services. Id.
163
Id. at 282. Consumers bear these costs through increases in the subscription
rate or a reduced package of services available from the cable company. Id. (citing
THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER, CABLE REGULATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT (1995)).
164
Id. at 282.
165
Cable price estimates for 2003 predicted a rise by an average of 5.4 percent
starting in January. Grover & Lowry, supra note 22, at 40.
166
As per the 1996 Act, rate regulations for large cable companies expired in
1999. Stepanicich, supra note 108. Cable rates have increased 45 percent since the
nd
1996 Act. Holly M. Sanders, Echostar Has 2 -Qtr Profit After Adding Customers,
BLOOMBERG NEWS, Aug. 15, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Bloomberg News file.
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167

from another company without moving to a different municipality.
Customers bear non-pecuniary costs of cable monopolies in a
168
variety of ways, including unpunctual responses to service calls and
fewer programming options. Programming options, which cable
169
operators typically provide in several tiers, vary at the operator’s
170
It would appear elementary that a large number of
discretion.
video channels results in a correspondingly large number of program
171
sources to choose from. That reasoning is confounded by the dual
172
In the
function performed by a cable franchise holder.
programming sense, complications arise in circumstances of cross173
ownership of programming channels and distribution services.
174
In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a
constitutional challenge to two provisions of the 1992 Act. At issue
were the “subscriber limits provision” that authorizes the FCC to
175
“limit the number of subscribers a cable operator may reach,” and
the “channel occupancy provision” that “directs the [FCC] to limit
the number of channels on a cable system that may be devoted to
176
video programming in which the operator has a financial interest.”
In upholding the “subscriber limits provision,” the court echoed
167

See supra Part III (discussing exclusive municipal franchises).
Terrence Dopp, Cable Providers Lash Out at Lawmakers, THE EXPRESS-TIMES
(Easton, PA), Oct. 17, 2002. The New Jersey Legislature had proposed a plan under
which one component “would require companies to respond to all service
complaints within three hours.” Id.
169
FCC Ninth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. at 26909 n.12. The FCC explained that in the
tier structure
[t]he primary level of cable television service is commonly referred to
as “basic service” and must be taken by all subscribers. The content of
basic service varies widely among cable systems but, pursuant to the
Communications Act, must include all local television signals and
public, educational, and governmental access channels and, at the
discretion of the cable operator, may include other video
programming services. One or more expanded tiers of services, . . .
often known as expanded basic, also may be offered to subscribers.
These expanded tiers of service usually include additional video
programming channels.
Id.
170
See id.
171
Eli M. Noam, Towards An Integrated Communications Market: Overcoming the Local
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 209, 210-11 (1982).
172
Id. at 211.
173
See Yankees, at 3. For example, Cablevision is the majority owner and manager
of MSG and FSNY. Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D4.
174
211 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1183 (2001).
175
Id. at 1315; see also 47 U.S.C. § 533(f)(1)(A) (1996).
176
Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1315; see also § 533(f)(1)(B).
168
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congressional concern about likely anticompetitive effects resulting
177
from concentration in the media.
The court deferred to the
substantial evidence presented in the congressional report
accompanying the 1992 Act stating that “increases in the
concentration of cable operators threatened diversity and
178
In upholding the “channel
competition in the cable industry.”
occupancy provision,” the court noted both the statutory aim of
promoting diversity of available programming and the provision’s
179
content-neutral applicability.
In its analysis, the court focused on
the incentive and ability of cable operators to favor their affiliated
180
programmers, which imposes economic barriers to competition.
Before Time Warner, the United States Supreme Court had
upheld the “must-carry” provision of the 1992 Act in Turner
181
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.
That provision required cable
182
operators to carry local network signals on their systems. The Court
183
upheld the provision against petitioner’s First Amendment claims,
concluding that it was narrowly tailored to render the burden
184
The Court quoted its
imposed congruent to the benefits created.
185
earlier opinion in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., stating that
“increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression
represents a ‘long-established regulatory goal in the field of television
186
broadcasting.’”
The Court also identified “‘a governmental purpose of the
highest order’ in ensuring public access to ‘a multiplicity of
information sources, [a]nd [a] Government . . . interest in
187
Those two goals
eliminating restraints on fair competition. . . .’”
should extend the justification of “must-carry” beyond merely
requiring cable operators to carry local broadcast signals to also
requiring the carrying of channels emanating from unrelated
programmers. Presently, such an extension of the holding does not

177

Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1316.
Id. at 1319-20.
179
Id. at 1321.
180
Id. at 1322.
181
520 U.S. 180 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II].
182
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 532-35 (1996).
183
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224-25.
184
Id. at 215-16.
185
406 U.S. 649 (1972) (plurality opinion).
186
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 192-93 (quoting Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. at 667-68).
187
Id. at 190 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64 (1994)
[hereinafter Turner I]).
178
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188

exist.
In reality, cable operators possess the ability to “silence the
189
voice of competing speakers with a mere flick of the switch.”
The Court noted that in enacting the 1992 Act, Congress
attempted to address concerns regarding the “increasing
190
concentration of ownership and control in the cable industry.” The
Court reasoned that the “must-carry” and “subscriber limits”
provisions preclude cable operators from using their “bottleneck
[monopoly] power to exclude other providers of cable
191
programming.” Further, the Court noted Congress’s concern that
cable operators might not let other programmers “say anything at all
192
in the principal medium for reaching much of the public” and that
the two provisions thereby serve to promote competition in the
193
industry.
Thus, the Court upheld Congress’s stated aims for the
channel occupancy provision: increasing the number of voices
available to cable viewers and placing reasonable limits on the
194
number of channels an operator could occupy.
The aforementioned provisions of the 1992 Act attempted to
resolve the problem caused by vertical integration in the cable
195
industry.
Vertical integration occurs when a company uses its
monopoly power over one aspect of the production chain to stifle
188

Congress has opposed an FCC ruling that would have granted the largest
television stations the ability to grow by owning more stations. Stephen Labaton,
F.C.C. Media Rule Blocked in House in a 400-to-21 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2003 at A1
[hereinafter Labaton I]. The proposed FCC rule sought to expand the cap on a
single company’s ownership of “television stations reaching 45 percent of the
nation’s households, but the House measure would return the ownership cap to 35
percent.” Id. Supporters of the legislation against the FCC rule asserted that
“further media consolidation would reduce the diversity of voices on the airwaves.”
Id. at C6. The rule was similarly opposed in the Senate. Stephen Labaton, F.C.C.
Plan to Ease Curbs on Big Media Hits Senate Snag, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2003 at A1.
189
Turner II, 520 U.S. at 197 (quoting Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656).
190
Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1316 (referencing the Senate Report accompanying
the final version of the 1992 Act, S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 32 (1991), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1165, stating “there are special concerns about concentration of the
media in the hands of a few who may control the dissemination of information”).
191
Id. at 1317.
192
Id. at 1317-18 (citing Turner I, 512 U.S. at 656-57); see also Labaton I, supra note
188, at C6.
193
Id. at 1318.
194
S. REP. NO. 102-92, at 25, 80 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1158, 1213.
195
Time Warner, 211 F.3d at 1322. Legislative history accompanying the 1992 Act
“document[s] Congress’s concerns with affiliation between cable operators and cable
programmers.” Id. “The cable industry has become vertically integrated; cable
operators and cable programmers often have common ownership. As a result, cable
operators have the incentive and ability to favor their affiliated programmers. This
could make it more difficult for noncable-affiliated programmers to secure carriage
on cable systems.” Id.
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competition in another aspect that ordinarily would have been
196
competitive.
The cable television industry can be viewed in three
stages of production and distribution that includes manufacturers,
197
Vertical integration in the cable
wholesalers, and retailers.
television industry could occur when networks (the wholesalers) own
198
a large amount of broadcast stations (the retailers).
The most
direct solution to vertical integration separates the distribution role
199
of a cable company from its programming function.
Such a
divestiture need not occur, however, if the company is simply
mandated to allow access by other programmers.
Addressing a different industry, the Supreme Court required an
analogous access to competition in United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n
200
of St. Louis when it dealt with the Terminal Railroad Association
201
Mindful of the waste that multiple
consortium in the late 1800s.
railroad lines could cause, the Court required the consortium to
provide access to its tracks and bridges to competing companies on
202
“reasonable terms and regulations.”
The Court noted that joining two cities by more than one
203
railroad line created an “unnecessary duplication of facilities.”
As
mentioned above, the courts used the same language to justify cable
204
monopolies, yet cable rulings varied from Terminal R.R. because
they lacked the mandatory provision of access to competing
companies. In the barest sense, the cable and railroad industries are
similar with respect to the transportation of goods and services over
their respective “lines.” A ruling applying the Terminal R.R. “essential
205
facilities doctrine” to cable companies could invite competition
196

Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 176 (2002).
197
Id. at 182.
198
Id. at 183-84.
199
Noam, supra note 171, at 216.
200
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
201
Teague I. Donahey, Terminal Railroad Revisited: Using the Essential Facilities
Doctrine to Ensure Accessibility to Internet Software Standards, 25 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS’N Q.J. 277, 279 (1997). “In 1889, a group of railroad companies . . . formed the
Terminal Railroad Association . . . in order to consolidate the various railroad
facilities and thoroughfares in St. Louis, including the central train station . . . and
every connecting railroad system within the city and on either side of the river.” Id.
202
Id. at 281 (quoting Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411).
203
Id. at 286 (quoting Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 393).
204
See Omega Satellite Prod. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th
Cir. 1982).
205
Donahey, supra note 201, at 307-08. “The essential facilities doctrine . . . is
generally understood to have its origins in Terminal Railroad.” Id. The doctrine
mandates access to the essential facilities of a monopolist when that monopolist
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while still allowing the incumbent company to remain.
The tale of cable industry regulation parallels the experience of
regulation of the railroad industry. After World War II, railroads
207
faced competition primarily from the trucking industry.
The
trucking industry offered distinct advantages over the railroad
208
industry, which left the railroad industry behind the technological
209
curve.
Unfortunately, railway regulation continued to persist for
210
some time after these developments until Congress finally scaled
211
the regulations back in 1980. Cable monopolies face a similar wave
212
of competing technologies advancing upon their monopoly power
213
This deregulation is a
and have had their share of deregulation.
beacon of hope for the future of competition in the video
marketplace. As the railroad example demonstrates, the regulatory
mechanism might do more harm than good by producing more
214
inefficiency than it eliminates.

possesses a “bottleneck” monopoly. Id.; see also MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1983).
206
Terminal R.R., 224 U.S. at 411. The Court preserved “to the public [the]
system of great public advantage.” Id.
207
Donahey, supra note 201, at 303 (citing THEODORE E. KEELER, RAILROADS,
FREIGHT, AND PUBLIC POLICY 28 (1983)). The trucking industry was also regulated,
but deregulation began in 1980. Id. at 304. In the first six years of deregulation, the
number of carriers doubled and prices fell between 28 and 56 percent. See Robert
Crandall & Jerry Ellig, Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice: Lessons for the Electric
Industry, The Center for Market Processes, George Mason University, at
http://www.mercatus.org/research/dereg_summary.html (March 12, 2003).
208
Id. Notable advantages were increased efficiencies and lower costs. Id.
209
Donahey, supra note 201, at 304.
210
Lawrence W. Reed, Deregulation: Coming to a Utility Near You, THE FREEMAN, Vol.
47, No. 8, Aug. 1997, available at http://www.libertyhaven.com. Railroad regulation
“stifled competition, boosted costs, reduced management flexibility, and left
railroads unable to compete effectively with alternative . . . modes of transportation.”
Id. The delay in railroad deregulation is attributed to the cumbersome regulatory
scheme and the railroad industry’s support for the regulation that ensured their
profit margins, despite prevailing questions of service quality. Donahey, supra note
201, at 304-05. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 (1965);
Bruce B. Wilson, Railroads, Airlines, and the Antitrust Laws in the Post-Regulatory World:
Common Concerns and Shared Lessons, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 711-16 (1991).
211
Donahey, supra note 201, at 304. See Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96448, 94 Stat. 1895 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 45 and 49 U.S.C.).
Since deregulation, “prices have declined 44 percent [and] delivery time has
improved dramatically.” Reed, supra note 210.
212
See Donahey, supra note 201, at 304 n.102; see also supra Part III (discussing the
competing technologies).
213
See supra Part II (discussing statutory deregulation of the cable television
industry).
214
Donahey, supra note 201, at 305.
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V. CONCLUSION
Competition is the method best suited to drive down prices, to
215
increase quality of service, and to offer options to consumers. The
long overdue deregulation of the telecommunications sector injected
competitive effects that have impacted the cable television industry.
Cable companies, however, continue to possess exclusive municipal
franchises that prevent customers from selecting among alternate
providers. The absurdity of this problem is evident when customers
living across the street from each other are afforded different
opportunities by virtue of living in separate municipalities.
Fortunately for disheartened consumers, choices have recently
begun to emerge. Through technological advances, DBS companies
have positioned themselves as cable’s biggest competitor. While DBS
subscribership has yet to rise to a level necessary to consider it a true
competitor to cable, that level may soon be reached. DBS has
216
siphoned off nearly one million cable customers in 2002, and the
217
industry is expected to continue to grow in 2003.
DBS has thus
been able to enter the marketplace despite the cable companies’
present monopoly position. The loss of cable company subscribers to
218
DBS providers
indicates the tenuous justification for cable
monopolies. The dispute between YES and Cablevision displays how
cable companies continue to fight to maintain their position, to the
detriment of consumers.
Without the intervention of the New Jersey Legislature, New
219
York City Mayor Bloomberg, and New York State Attorney General
220
Eliot Spitzer, Cablevision customers seeking to view Yankees and
Nets telecasts would still be in a difficult position. Although the
settlement ended the stalemate, it merely created a temporary
solution specific to this local dispute and provided no permanent
solution for the industry. In a competitive market, customers could
simply cancel their Cablevision subscription and select another video
provider. Exclusive municipal franchises, however, preclude the
selection of another cable provider. Even worse, the alternative
215

Wakeford, supra note 80, at 285. Commentators contend that “under the
contestable market theory, . . . cable operators will provide the same rates and
services as if they were faced with direct competition.” Id.
216
Grover & Lowry, supra note 22, at 40.
217
Ronald Grover & Tom Lowry, Media: Return of the Dealmakers, BUS. WK., Jan. 13,
2003, at 126.
218
Id. The forecasts for 2003 had DBS increasing their subscribership by 3 million
customers at cable companies’ expense. Id.
219
Sandomir I, supra note 15, at D1.
220
Sandomir II, supra note 15, at S2.
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presented by DBS, to forego any cable service whatsoever, may not
221
appeal to all consumers or the consumers may not yet benefit from
222
these advantages.
Deregulation, despite its advantages, is not a complete solution
to the problems created by regulation. The telephone industry
experienced per-minute rate decreases following deregulation, but
that reduction was a result of regulated cuts in telephone access
223
charges. Cable television subscription rates have skyrocketed under
224
In a rare positive aspect, regulation provided an
deregulation.
225
additional benefit to consumers in helping to foster the Internet.
Nonetheless, cable television regulation imposes many burdens, and
an overhaul of the regulation can better serve the community’s
226
interests.
By no means are cable companies the villains in the present
situation. They simply had the benefit of monopoly status in the past
and are now faced with a changing industry. The concept of
competition in the video marketplace requires consumer choice and
infers that incumbent cable companies remain an important player
227
in the video programming marketplace. Competition will force the

221

Grover and Lowry, supra note 22, at 40. “[Cable companies are] pushing
higher-margin services—especially high-speed Internet access—that satellite can’t yet
offer.” Id.
222
See States with Direct-To-Home Dish Penetration of Fifteen Percent or More, July 2001, at
http://www.skyreport.com (last visited Oct. 3, 2002). As of 2001, Vermont ranked
first with 41.62% of television households having satellite television penetration. Id.
“The only significant remaining impediment to [DBS] deployment is the inability of .
. . DBS operators to reach residents living in large apartment buildings.” Yoo, supra
note 196, at 208 n.153; see also In re Ann. Assessment of the Status of Competition in
the Mkt. for the Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Ann. Rep., 17 F.C.C.R. 1244,
1300-05 (2002).
223
Deregulated, supra note 75, at 32. Access charges are the fees “regulated local
phone companies on each end of an interstate call charge long-distance carriers to
connect through the local equipment.” Id.
224
Id. at 33.
225
Id. at 32. This occurred, “according to the GAO, by barring AT&T and the
‘Baby Bells’ from providing data-processing and information services and thus
stifling competition, and by a Federal Communications Commission not to impose
access charges on Internet service providers, keeping costs down.” Id.
226
Health of the Telecommunications Sector: A Perspective from the Commissioners of the
Federal Communications Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and the Internet of the House Comm. on Commerce and Energy, 108th Cong. 38 (2003)
(statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Commissioner, Federal Communications
Commission). Commissioner Abernathy commented that “[t]hese dramatic changes
[in telecommunications] compel us to analyze whether our existing rules best serve
the public interest.” Id.
227
J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in
Network Industries, 15 YALE J. ON REG. 117, 127 (1998).
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incumbents to adapt to a new marketplace because rate increases and
poor service quality are not feasible business decisions when a
competitor can attract customers by offering more favorable service
options. Competition has changed the landscape of the market, but
228
“[t]he job is not yet done.”
As competition continues to embed
itself in the industry, the future for the video marketplace looks
bright for customers and providers alike. Officially breaking the
monopolistic stranglehold that cable companies enjoy over
consumers by eliminating exclusive cable franchises would
significantly brighten that picture.

228

Cable and Video: Competitive Choices: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 19
(2001) (statement of Robert Sachs, President & CEO, National Cable Television
Association).

